The Guard and Reserve

About two years ago, my good friend and mentor Tad Curtis became aware of certain allegations respecting the combat readiness of Army National Guard and Reserve units. These assertions, made by a member of a reserve unit, were pretty unnerving for someone who spent an entire career preparing Marines for the ultimate test of combat. The accusation included charges that guard and reserve units were little more than a “good old boy” network of lazy and inefficient folks who were happy to draw their paychecks and take advantage of their benefits, but who in fact weren’t doing much to earn those checks or subsidies. For example, they weren’t doing any field training; they were doctoring training records, falsifying equipment maintenance records, pencil-whipping annual weapons qualification, and doctoring personnel and equipment inspection reports. Of course, this speaks volumes about the lack of integrity among some officers and senior NCOs, but there is a much worse consequence than simple dishonesty: the troops were not prepared for their roles in combat.

Now, according to a report filed by Robert Burns with the Associated Press, the Pentagon is reporting soaring death rates among members of the guard and reserve serving in Iraq. This is precisely the concern of Colonel Curtis some two years ago, and it is what prompted him to write to the President of the United States about his concerns. According to Burns, “. . .Pentagon casualty reports show that the number of deaths among Guard and Reserve forced has been trending upward for much of this year, totaling more than 100 since 1 May [2005].” Burns reports that the Pentagon is rejecting any claim that Guard and Reserve units are more vulnerable in combat because they are only part-time military personnel. According to Air Force Lieutenant Colonel Ellen Krenke, a Pentagon spokes person, “We will not deploy a soldier, sailor, airman, or Marine who not fully trained and prepared for the mission.”

But the Brookings Institute sees it differently. According to Michael O’Hanlon, “. . . though the performance of reservists has been generally excellent, some are shortchanged on training before arriving in Iraq.” Mr. Burns wrote, “The increasing death toll among Reserve forces in recent months reflects, at least in part, their more prominent role in Iraq. They represent about half of all U. S. combat forces there, or double their share in early 2004.”

In my view, there is no reason for any Reserve or Guard unit not to be ready to assume a combat role. That is the entire purpose of having reserve forces in the first place. That some units are ill prepared for that role suggests that it isn’t just unit officers and NCOs who are not doing their jobs; service inspectors-general are not doing their jobs, either. We can hope that the problem is with just one or two units, but we must ensure that it isn’t a force-wide concern; the situation demands the prompt attention of service chiefs and an insistence from the highest levels on optimum readiness and training of Guard and Reserve forces. There can be no worse example of poor leadership than allowing one’s troops into harms way when individual soldiers and units are not prepared to assume that role. The effect of substandard training, to put it bluntly, is a death warrant for troops who deserve far better than they may be getting.

If inadequate training is directly related to poor unit leaders, then someone needs to get rid of those officers and NCOs and cultivate leaders who know how to lead. If the problem is inadequate funding, then let’s stop buying jet aircraft for generals to ride around in and devote more attention to small unit training and individual combat skills. If this means extending annual training duty for members of the Guard and Reserve to 30 days, as opposed to only two-weeks a year, then that is what should happen — and it shouldn’t require a long-term discussion. As one Army reservist recently told me, “True professionalism [in the combat arms] requires both training and experience.”

While it must not give Colonel Curtis much satisfaction, he was apparently right to be concerned. He did what he should have done when he put his concerns in writing and forwarded them to the highest echelons of our government. It is pathetic, in my view, that no one was paying attention — until now, but even now the Pentagon is spinning the issue, and that too is an integrity problem.